Commercial policy is often advocated as a useful tool for combating such macroeconomic ills as unemployment and chronic balance of payments deficits. This paper examines the role of expectations in determining the output and employment effects of various commercial policies. In a rational expectations framework in which workers have incomplete information, it is shown that (i) the shortrun output and employment effects of commercial policy changes depend crucially on the correlation between real and nominal wages and that (ii) the use of commercial policy as an instrument of short-run stabilization policy cannot be divorced from its long-run effects on real wages, output, and employment.
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of the market, firms are -assumed to know their output prices at the time employment decisions are made, so that the demand for labor by firms depends on the actual real wage measured in units of their own output as implied by profit-maximizing behavior.
This simple framework yields two main insights into the macroeconomic effects of commercial policy. First, the short-run output and employment effects of commercial policy will depend crucially on whether shocks that have increased nominal wages have ultimately tended to be associated with increased, unchanged, or decreased real wages.4 This result arises due to the forecasting problem confronting workers. At the time employment decisions are made, workers do not observe current prices, but they do observe the current nominal wage offers being made by firms. These wage offers convey some information to workers about the current state of the economy and thus help to determine the price level workers expect to prevail in the current period, and hence the expected real wage workers associate with firms' nominal wage offers. Since the solution to this forecasting problem will depend on the nature of the shocks affecting the economy, the impact of commercial policy on employment will also depend on these shocks. The second main insight of the paper, which comes as no surprise in light of the recent literature on the effectiveness of monetary policy, is that the systematic element of tariff policy, and commercial policy in general, will be incorporated into workers' expectations. Therefore, when commercial policy is used as an instrument of short-run stabilization policy, its systematic element will have output and employment effects that are identical to its long-run effects. In the presence of rational expectations it is thus inappropriate for policymakers to dismiss as irrelevant the long-run effects of commercial policy-with such expectations there may be little merit to the frequently voiced claims that commercial policy can "buy time" for the economy to deal with its unemployment problem or for its industries to modernize. This view is in marked contrast to the position taken by the "Cambridge Economic Policy Group," who claim that the only way many industrialized nations can attain full employment is through a package of policies involving import restrictions as an integral part.' 4. The short run is taken to be that period within which workers do not fully perceive price changes.
5. See Eichengreen [1979] for a discussion of the views of the "Cambridge Economic Policy Group."
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the demand for and supply of labor. Section III characterizes labor market equilibrium, focusing on the determination of wages and employment in both the short run and the long run. Section IV lays out the solution to the forecasting problem facing workers and presents a closed-form solution for the short-run equilibrium. The fifth section of the paper examines the effects of a tariff on output and employment in both the short run and the long run and comments briefly on the effects of other types of commercial policies. The sixth section explores the implications of the analysis presented in Sections II through V for the use of commercial policy as a tool of stabilization policy.
II. THE DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF LABOR
In order to derive the demand for labor by firms in a given industry, it is necessary to consider the profit maximization problem they solve. The output of good i at time t, X-t, depends on the industry's employment of labor Nit, which is assumed to be the only variable input, the state of technology and the employment of fixed factors, both of which are summarized by a parameter A , and random elements that affect the production process uit. The random term u is assumed to be normally and independently distributed with mean zero and variance u'-. All this is summarized by industry i's production function:
(1) Xit = AiNIteuit; 0 e h 1, i = 1, 2.
The country in question is taken to be small so that world prices, Plt and P~t, are taken as given. Profit maximization on the part of competitive firms in industry i subject to the production function (1), the nominal wage Wt, and domestic prices, Plt and P2t, yields the demand for labor by industry i as6 reflects factors other than the own real wage, wt -Pit, that influ-6. For simplicity, it is assumed that firms are aware of the random elements affecting their own production function, the unit's, at the time this maximization problem is solved.
7. This convention is adopted throughout the paper.
ence the demand for labor such as the state of technology, the employment of fixed factors, and random elements affecting the production process.8 Given the demand for labor by each sector, it can be shown that the natural logarithm of the economy-wide demand for labor can be approximated by9
where Xi is the fraction of the labor force employed in sector i (note that X1 + X2 = 1) and n d is the aggregate demand for labor at time t. Using (2) in this expression yields 
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS E(ctlIt) is the price level expected by workers to prevail during period t based on the information set available to them at the beginning of the period I. The information set I, is assumed to include values of all lagged variables, denoted by fl,-and the current nominal wage rate Wt. Workers' expectations are assumed to be formed rationally.
III. A CHARACTERIZATION OF LABOR MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
The demand for and supply of labor was considered in the previous section, and it is natural at this point to examine the properties of labor market equilibrium in both the short run and the long run. The distinction between the two hinges on the definition of the short run as that time period within which workers do not fully perceive price changes. In the long run, however, both firms and workers have complete knowledge of all price movements. This means that workers' expectations regarding the current price level will be an important determinant of wages and employment in the short run, while only actual prices will play a role in the long run.
A. Wages and Employment
Labor market equilibrium at any point in time requires equality between the demand for and the supply of labor; that is, labor market equilibrium requires that n d= ns.
With the help of (3) These expressions are not suitable for analyzing the short-run effects of various shocks because up to this point workers' price level expectations have been treated as exogenous; no account has yet been taken of their dependence on the current nominal wage, which is part of the workers' information set. However, (7a)-(7c) can be used to obtain closed-form solutions for the longrun equilibrium levels of sectoral and aggregate employment.
B. Long-Run Equilibrium
Recall that the long run is being defined as that time period in which both firms and workers fully perceive all price movements. Operationally, this means that in the long run,
where the actual price level is given by (4). Through use of this, the long-run equilibrium levels of employment can be found by substituting (4) into (7a)-(7c) for the expected price level. Let a 12. Expressions (7a) and (7b) could be substituted into logarithmic versions of the production functions given in (1) to obtain expressions for the output of each good at time t. However, this is not done explicitly in this paper because the bulk of the analysis is concerned with the effects of price fluctuations. Hence, in the absence of other shocks, the fact that labor is the only variable input implies that the output of good i will vary directly with the level of employment in that sector.
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bar over a variable denote its long-run equilibrium (or full current information) value, and note that this yields'3 (8a) n1t = Yit -nlkt -7(T2 + a21t3)(P2t -Pit), (8b) n2t = Y2t -ri2kt + T12(TI + aOll3)(P2t -Pit), and (8c) nt = T3kt + (1 -Tr3)k + g(alrr2 -a2ITl)(p2t -pit)-Several features of (8a)-(8c) are noteworthy. The long-run levels of employment depend only on real factors such as (domestic) relative prices, tastes, and technology. The role of tastes and technology are reflected by the hy's and the k's, while the importance of relative prices is highlighted by the P2t -Pit terms in expressions (8a)-(8c). It can be seen from (8a) and (8b) that a rise in the relative price of a good will lead to an increase in employment in that sector and a decrease in employment in the other sector. However, as shown by (8c), whether an increase in the relative price of good two or an increase in the relative price of good 1 increases aggregate employment depends on the sign of aOiT2 -at21-5. ori and IT2 have previously been defined, so now it can be seen that an increase in the relative price of good 2, P2t -Pit, will increase or decrease aggregate employment as (9) aX1
That is, whether or not an increase in the relative price of good two increases or decreases aggregate employment depends on a comparison of the ratio of sectoral expenditure shares a1/a2 to the ratio of share-weighted elasticities of labor demand in each sector X111/X2q2. The larger the share of good one in expenditure; the larger the fraction of the labor force employed in industry two; the smaller the elasticity of demand for labor in industry one, and the larger the elasticity of demand for labor in industry two; the more likely it is that an increase in the relative price of good two will lead to an expansion of aggregate employment.'4 13. The corresponding solution for the long-run equilibrium nominal wage rate can be found by using (6) to be where vt is a disturbance term that is orthogonal to Wt -E(wt|fQt_ ) and has mean zero, and + is a least-squares regression coefficient about which more will be said shortly.
Under the assumption of rational expectations, workers' expectations are taken to be formed in a manner that is consistent with the model which, using (6), implies that As can be seen from the second term on the right-hand side of (14), which reflects the updating process, the new information conveyed by the nominal wage rate arises from the observation of the linear combination of kt, Pit, and P2t described by zt that it allows workers to make.
B. Interpretation of +
As indicated by (14), and as will be brought out in the next two sections of the paper, the magnitude of the regression parameter + plays a crucial role in determining the short-run output and employment effects of changes in commercial policy. For this reason, it is important to understand the factors that determine its magnitude. It is shown in the Appendix that'6 
Substituting (15) into (14)
, one can show that the coefficient of Zt -E(zt|Qt_ 1) in (14) is simply the least squares regression coefficient that would be obtained by regressing kt on Zt -E(ztQt-1). The forecasting problem facing workers could be approached more directly in this manner, but the approach adopted in the text seems to yield more insight into the economics of the problem.
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This result can be used to obtain some insight into the factors influencing the magnitude of A.
First, suppose that the only shocks affecting the economy are shocks to tastes and technology so that 'l2 = 12 2 =0.
In this case (15) indicates that + = 0. This means that the new information contained in the current nominal wage rate has no effect on workers' price level expectations as shown by (12) or (14) . Hence, any increase (decrease) in nominal wage offers that was not predictable based on flQ-1 is taken by workers to represent an increase (decrease) in real wage offers. This makes economic sense because given that domestic prices are not changing, any changes in nominal wages do in fact represent a change in the real wage.
Second, suppose that the only shocks influencing the economy are monetary shocks. In this instance U2 = 0, and Cu2 = CF12 U2.7 As can be seen from (15) Up to this point, the discussion of + has focused on special cases where shocks to the economy are of only one kind. However, real world economies are subject to simultaneous shocks of both the real and the monetary variety. This greatly complicates the forecasting problem facing workers and means that, generally speaking, any analysis of the short-run employment effects of changes in commercial policy will depend on the nature of the shocks affecting the particular economy in question. As an empirical matter, it seems fair to say that for many small countries the major source of price fluctuations are the monetary shocks to which they are subject. As long as these monetary shocks are sufficiently important, it is reasonable to assume that nominal prices will tend to move together so that U12> 0. Expression (15) indicates that under this condition + will be positive.18 The previous discussion also indicates that the presence of significant monetary shocks tends to push + toward unity. However, the presence of real shocks means that nominal wage changes will tend, at least to some extent, to be associated with long-run real wage changes. Hence, if nominal wage increases tend to be associated with long-run real wage increases, + < 1 will hold; while if nominal wage increases tend to be associated with long-run real wage decreases, + > 1 will hold.
C. Short-Run Equilibrium
Now that the workers' forecasting problem has been solved and interpreted, closed-form solutions for the short-run equilibrium values of the variables of interest can be derived. Using (14) in (6) These expressions will be used in the following sections to discuss the short-run employment effects of commercial policy changes and to examine the implications of these results for the use of commercial policy as a tool of stabilization policy.
V. THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL POLICY
The general principles concerning the short-run and longrun employment effects of commercial policy can be illustrated by considering the imposition of a tariff under a fixed exchange rate.19 In order to introduce tariffs explicitly into the analysis, let good 1 be the home country's exportable good and good 2 be the home country's importable good. Written in natural logarithms, the domestic price of good 2 is (18) P2t = P2t + Tt, where Tt = ln(l + tariff rate at time t).
19. If the exchange rate is flexible, the forecasting problem facing workers may differ in a fundamental way from that outlined in Section IV. For example, suppose that workers observe the contemporaneous exchange rate as well as the contemporaneous nominal wage rate at the time hiring decisions are made. In this instance, their forecast of the current price level will be improved, and it is less likely that the short-run and long-run employment effects of commercial policy changes will differ. In particular, under flexible exchange rates the problem must be recast so as to incorporate workers knowledge about asset market variables. However, as long as workers continue to make forecast errors, the general principles emerging from the discussion of the fixed exchange rate case will continue to hold.
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Using this in (17a) and (17b), one can show that when a tariff is levied, the exportable sector contracts, while the importable sector may either expand or contract. The reason for these results is that since nominal wages rise when a tariff is imposed, as shown by (16), the real wage in terms of exportables must rise, while the real wage in terms of importables may fall or rise. A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the real wage in terms of importables to rise and employment in the importable sector to contract is that 4 > 1.
It can be seen by using (18) in (17c) that aggregate employment expands or contracts following the imposition of a tariff as + ! 1. Hence if the shocks affecting the economy are such that nominal wage increases tend to be associated with long-run real wage increases (4) < 1), the imposition of a tariff will result in a short-run expansion of aggregate employment. On the other hand, if the shocks affecting the economy are such that nominal wage increases tend to be associated with long-run real wage decreases (4 > 1), the imposition of a tariff will reduce aggregate employment in the short run. Therefore, the short-run employment effects of tariffs and other types of commercial policies depend crucially on the nature of the shocks to which the economy is subject, for it is the nature of the shocks to which workers are accustomed that determines how workers perceive the nominal wage changes brought about by changes in commercial policy to be reflected in real wages.
In the long run the employment effects of a tariff can be found by substituting (18) The employment effects of other types of commercial policies can be analyzed in much the same manner as those of a tariff. First, consider the employment effects of imposing an export tax. This can be incorporated into the analysis by writing the domestic price of good 1 aspit = Pit -Vt, where vt = ln(1 + export tax rate at time t). It can be seen from (17a)-(17c) that the short-run employment effects of an export tax will differ from those of a tariff. The reason for the short-run nonequivalence of export taxes and tariffs is seen most easily from (16). While the imposition of a tariff increases nominal wages in the short-run, the imposition of an export tax decreases nominal wages in the short run. Hence the short-run employment effects of the two will not be equivalent. However, from Lerner's [1936] symmetry theorem it is apparent that the long-run employment effects of an export tax will be identical to those of a tariff. Since a devaluation is equivalent to levying a tariff and an export subsidy at the same rate, the model can also be used to examine the employment effects of an unanticipated devaluation. Quantitative restrictions on trade can also be studied in a qualitative manner using this framework. This follows from the equivalence theorems established by Bhagwati [1965] . However, a full-blown treatment of the employment effects of quantitative restrictions would require the explicit introduction of domestic (commodity) supply and demand conditions in order to calculate the tariff or export tax equivalent of import quotas and export quotas.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The basic policy conclusion emerging from this paper is that only the unanticipated component of commercial policy will have employment effects corresponding to the short-run effects discussed in Section V. Anticipated, or systematic, components of commercial policy will have effects described by the long-run results summarized by expressions (8a)-(8c). To the extent that major shifts in commercial policy are highly publicized and subjected to heated political debate, it is these long-run results that are relevant for policy discussions.20 Also, to the extent that commercial policy is used in a systematic manner as part of a country's overall stabilization package, these long-run results are once again relevant, unless the government can react more rapidly to new information than the private sector does.21 For example, trigger pricing mechanisms might, at least in principle, act much like automatic stabilizers and hence allow commercial policy to respond to new information more rapidly than does the private sector, so that for policy purposes the short-run employment effects outlined in Section V would be relevant.
Before concluding, one word of caution is in order. Even though this paper has demonstrated that commercial policy can be used as a tool of stabilization policy, since, like any real policy, its 20. The model outlined in the body of the paper is applicable to issues other than commercial policy. For instance, the effects of terms-of-trade changes and technology changes on output and employment can be considered within this framework. Since some of these events can be foreseen in the same way that changes in commercial policy can (e.g., future world price trends can be forecast on the basis of the growing capacity of the newly industrialized countries), the long-run results may go a [ong way toward explaining their output and employment effects. 
